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Abstract 
The impact of globalization on the pro- 
vision of assistance to newcomers is 
assessed in this paper. It takes a philo- 
sophical view ofcivilisation and argues 
that, a culture of caring is not an oasis in 
the emerging "global civilisation," but 
the source of its renewal. This culture of 
caring is contrasted with a more indi- 
vidualistic conception of isolation. In- 
tervention of the state is required for 
curbing exploitative activities on iso- 
la ted individuals. In contrast, the paper 
argues that civilisation might tempo- 
rarily disrupt cultural values such as 
those geared to redistribution of wealth 
and the welcome we render to newcom- 
ers. However, recovery is  possible 
through a set of moral rules and regula- 
tions which are independent of the s ta te. 
Prkis 
Cet article traite de l'impact de la 
globalisation sur l'assistance apportte 
aux nouveaux arrivants. I1 se fonde sur 
une vision philosophique de la civilisa- 
tion et dheloppe m e  argumentation 
selon laquelle une culture d u  soutien 
(culture of caring) ne doit pas &re vue 
comme un sorte d'oasis isolt duns la 
"civilisation globule" en tmergence, 
mais plutdt comme la source vive de son 
renouvellement. Cette culture du sou- 
tien est ici mise en  contraste avec 
l'isolationnisme individualiste. Gin6 
ralement, c'est l'interuention de l'ttat 
qui est invoquk quand il s'agit defrei- 
ner l'exploitation intensive h laquelle 
l'individu isolt est expost. Se plapnt 
quelque peu en porte-rf-fhux face h cette 
conception, l'au teur dtveloppe une  
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argumentation selon laquelle la civili- 
sation pourrait bien se mettre h bouscu- 
ler temporairement certaines valeurs 
culturelles repes,  telles celles prtconi- 
sant la redistribution des richesses ou 
l'accueil inconditionnel des nouveaux 
arrivants. Cependant, un rajus tement 
demeure possible via u n  ensemble de 
rkgles morales et de rtglementations, 
inddpendantes de celles h i s e s  ou p r t ~  
conistes par l'tta t. 
The dominant narratives of modernity 
and the development of the English- 
speaking nation-state address the is- 
sues of the mind, the body, and how 
the mind and bodies of each individual 
and a multiplicity of individuals are 
made to cohere in the body politic. 
As we approach the end of moder- 
nity and the old age of the nation state, 
it is well to recall the three different 
versions of the origin of the nation- 
state at the dawn of modernity. We can 
use the theories of British origins to il- 
lustrate those different narratives. One 
theory, rooted in the body, is that the 
nation-state is forged in war. Its theo- 
retician is Thomas Hobbes-the body 
politic is formed when men, to secure 
themselves, that is, their bodies, both 
from outsiders and each other, make a 
compact whereby the will of the major- 
ity (a democracy), or the will of a spe- 
cific elite (an oligarchy or aristocracy), 
or the will of one (a monarchy or dicta- 
torship), is taken to be the will of every 
man in order to have a sovereign au- 
thority. In that way, a nation state is 
born (De Cive 1:3). In that nation-state, 
individuals retain one absolute right in 
the civil society-the right to self-de- 
fence and self-preservation. 
In historical/empirical terms, Linda 
Colley in Britons: Forging the Nation 
1707-1 837 depicts the development of 
Britain from an Act of Union between 
England, Wales and Scotland in 1707 
through the succession of wars with 
Catholic France culminating in the 
Napoleonic Wars and the battle of 
Waterloo to forge the British nation. 
Men and women from different ethnic 
and social backgrounds found a unity 
in the imperial destiny of Britain. Ironi- 
cally, in the twentieth century, state- 
engendered nationalism and the 
product of anation-state forgedin war, 
is most characteristic of those states of 
Africa that won their independence 
from empires. 
In a second version of national ori- 
gins, the development of the state is sui 
generis, emerging from the unique and 
particular characteristics of a people. It 
is a story of Miinchhausen who can lift 
himself up by his own bootstraps. Its 
theoretician is John Lockethe body 
politic is forged when men together 
subject themselves to the rule of law 
(as opposed to the rule of men in 
Hobbes) to secure their property and 
rights, the most basic being a natural 
right to self-preservation along the 
model of an independent craftsman 
(rather than the more passive "secu- 
rity" of Hobbes). The individual intro- 
duces his labour into nature to convert 
that nature into an artifact as exten- 
sions of self in the form of property. 
Though, as in Hobbes, the polis derives 
its power from the delegation of its 
individual members, those members 
never surrender the right to regain 
those powers if those in power forfeit 
their trust. What is even more impor- 
tant, the productive power of society 
resides in labour power, the creative 
energy of the individual; the regula- 
tion of such power is also surrendered 
and can also be redeemed if its regula- 
tion is not carried out for the public 
good. 
Aboriginal peoples, who had rights 
to treaties in their quest for self-preser- 
vation in Hobbes, lost their rights in 
the Lockean scheme of things because 
they belonged to a state of nature with- 
out a cash economy and a sense of 
property as possession and extension 
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of the self. Nor did they have self- 
formed contractarian governments. 
Lockean theory thus provided an 
apologetic for the rape of land of the 
aboriginal people and the genocide of 
those people regarded as aliens in a 
state of nature. Ironically, it was' also 
the foundation of modern human 
rights theory. Citizens had civil and 
political rights and a shared social soli- 
darity in the state that guaranteed 
those rights. However, aboriginals 
were not citizens in this conception. 
In empirical/historical terms, Liah 
Greenfeld (Nationalism: Five Roads to 
Modernity) provides the narrative for 
this self transformation of Britain from 
a group of foreigners studying to- 
gether as a nation at a university 
abroad to a group with shared convic- 
tions differing from those of other na- 
tions, to an elite within the nation, and 
then to the people as a whole who are 
said to share these same values and 
thereby constitute a sovereign and 
unique people. Nationalism and the 
democratic right of a people to rule 
themselves are two complementary 
parts of the same vision. But so is the 
nullification of the other who is not 
considered to fall within the orbit of 
self-governance and the pursuit of 
property as happiness. 
Though this liberal-nationalist, as 
opposed to state-nationalist, version of 
the nation-state had its roots in one 
version of British history, its clearest 
and most unequivocal example is the 
United States of America.' Nation 
meant a polity formed by free and 
equal individuals versus a polity 
formed by uniting adjacent territories 
and giving union to a people in conflict 
with an enemy. Ironically, in the 
United States, the unity of the republic 
had to be won by the conquest of those 
who opposed freedom and equality of 
all individuals in order to preserve the 
tradition of slavery. At the same time, 
in the name of the liberty and equality 
of all individuals, the aboriginal peo- 
ples were driven off the land, even 
when, as in the case of the Cherokees, 
they were agriculturalists, but their 
view of the land was not an extension 
of self conceptualized in terms of land 
ownership and land values, but as the 
ground for ancestral roots and collec- 
tive responsibility.2 
In these two versions we forge our 
identities in relationship either to the 
enemy-other or in the denial of the re- 
ality of the other in favour of the self- 
sufficient self. But there is a third tale. 
The identity of the nation-state is 
forged in relationship to the proxi- 
mate-other rather than either the en- 
emy-other or the other-denied as the 
ground for asserting the .reality of a 
self-sufficient self. The theoreticians 
for this story are tobe found among the 
Scottish common sense theoreticians 
of sentiment, in particular, the much- 
distorted Adam Smith and, more self- 
evidently, David Hume. They reject 
the foundationalism of both Hobbes 
and Locke while adhering to their 
empiricism. On the other hand, they 
asserted that there were a priori princi- 
ples which were the conditions of 
having any experience whatsoever, a 
conviction that turned Kant's head 
around, but without his carrying on 
the Scottish conviction that there could 
be no certain foundation for truth or 
fundamental basis for a political and 
moral order. The moral (and political) 
order are founded on agreements of 
sentiments rather than a contract for 
self-preservation or self-protection of 
one's property and person. Mutuality 
is established when our sentiments 
correspond with one another. One can- 
not sympathize with another unless 
one imagines oneself in another's 
place. Emotional empathy or care is 
fundamental to justice rather than al- 
lowing care to express itself within a 
legal regime of justice which protects 
individual rights or a regime of the all- 
powerful state in which sentiment is 
dep4ored and rights are trampled. For 
Huhe, the issue was the extension of 
the impressions on the self to enable a 
concern for the feelings and well-being 
of others to be forged. 
The empirical socialhistorian of this 
version of the development of the Brit- 
ish nation, though traceable directly 
back to Hume's own histories, in con- 
temporary terms is probably best evi- 
denced in the writings of Robin Cohen 
(Frontiers ofldentity: The British and the 
Others) and hishistorical account of the 
evolution of British sentimentality. 
That familiar other shifted from the 
Celts to the Dominions, from the Com- 
monwealth to the Atlantic pact, but 
when the European, the traditional 
enemy-other, became the familiar 
other in the vision of a European Un- 
ion, the extraterrestrial concept of the 
alien as totally other imported from 
Europe challenged the previously am- 
biguous boundaries of self and other. 
Ethnic-nationalism had been superirn- 
posed on Tory, Whig and Progressive 
Britain. 
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